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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950638-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT REEDY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Robert Reedy appeals from a final order revoking 
his probation in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF TOE ISSUE 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in revoking 
defendant's probation based on its conclusion that the filing of 
a probation violation report tolled the running of the 
probationary period? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A determination to revoke probation is 
within the discretion of the trial court. [This Court] will 
reverse only if the evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the [trial] court's decision, is so deficient that 
it must be concluded the trial court abused its discretion." 
State v. Ruesga. 851 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)). However, the 
district court!s conclusions of law underlying its decision to 
revoke probation are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (9) (b) (Supp. 1992): 
The running of the probation period is 
tolled upon the filing of a violation report 
with the court alleging a violation of the 
terms and conditions of probation or upon the 
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 25, 1993, Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) filed a 
Progress/Violation Report with a supporting affidavit indicating 
that Reedy had violated the terms of his probation. (R. 44, 
47-48) . Consequently, the district court issued a bench warrant 
for Reedy's arrest and an order requiring Reedy to appear before 
the court to show cause why his probation should not be revoked 
or modified. (R. 43, 45-46) . 
On May 9, 1995, an amended affidavit was submitted to the 
district court by AP&P, (R. 51-52), and the court issued a second 
warrant for Reedy's arrest. (R. 53). Following his arrest, 
Reedy appeared before the court on May 15 for his order to show 
cause hearing. However, because Reedy's counsel was not present, 
the matter was postponed until May 22. (R. 55). At the May 22 
hearing, Reedy appeared with counsel and denied the allegations 
in the amended affidavit, and the case was set for disposition on 
June 5, 1995. (R. 56-57). At the June 5 hearing, however, Reedy 
admitted all of the probation violations alleged in the amended 
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affidavit, (R. 188-89). Consequently, the district court found 
that Reedy had violated the conditions of his probation and, 
therefore, revoked the same and ordered that he serve his 
sentence at the Utah State Prison. (R. 58-59) . Reedy and his 
counsel each filed a motion to reconsider, (R. 72-90, 91-117), 
which motions were denied. (R. 128). On September 19, 1995, the 
district court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
an order revoking Reedy!s probation and committing him to the 
Utah State Prison. (R. 129-39). (A copy of the district court's 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order is attached 
hereto as Addendum A.) Reedy subsequently filed the instant 
appeal, alleging that the district court abused its discretion in 
revoking his probation. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On September 5, 1991, Robert Reedy was charged by 
information with theft, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). (R. 6). Reedy subsequently 
pleaded guilty to a third degree felony. (R. 24-30). The 
district court accepted Reedy's plea, (R. 30), and scheduled his 
sentencing hearing for November 22, 1991. (R. 31). 
After Reedy failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, 
(R. 34), the district court issued a warrant for his arrest. 
(R. 36). Reedy was subsequently arrested, (R. 37), and brought 
before the court for a sentencing hearing on May 8, 1992. 
(R. 40). At that time, the district court sentenced Reedy to an 
indeterminate term "not to exceed five years" at the Utah State 
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Prison. Id. The district court then stayed execution of the 
sentence and placed Reedy on probation for a period of 18 months, 
subject to certain conditions. Id. The conditions of Reedy!s 
probation included requirements that he: (1) obey the "usual and 
ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation and 
Parole," (2) serve six months in the Salt Lake County Jail (with 
credit for ninety days served), (3) pay a fine of $500, and 
(4) make restitution in the amount of $4444. (R. 41). 
On June 25, 1993, AP&P filed a Progress/Violation Report 
indicating that Reedy had violated the terms of his probation. 
(R. 44). The report stated that on June 24, Reedy!s probation 
officer, Spencer Nielsen, conducted a field home visit at Reedyfs 
last residence of record. Id. Reedy was not at home, and his 
brother informed Nielsen that Reedy had gone to California a 
month and a half earlier. Id. Because Reedy had not obtained a 
Travel Permit nor made his monthly phone calls for April, May, or 
June, the report indicated that Reedy was to be considered a 
fugitive from justice. Id. In addition, the affidavit submitted 
in support of the Progress/Violation Report stated that Reedy had 
violated the terms of his probation by having left the State 
without prior authorization and by failing to pay either his $500 
fine or his $4444 restitution. (R. 47-48) . 
Upon receiving the Progress/Violation Report and supporting 
affidavit, the district court issued a bench warrant for Reedyfs 
arrest and an order requiring Reedy to appear before the court to 
show cause why his probation should not be revoked or modified. 
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(R. 43, 45-46). Both documents were issued on June 25, 1993, see 
id., however, because Reedy had absconded to California, the date 
of the Reedy!s hearing on the Order to Show Cause was left blank 
pending Reedy1s arrest. (R. 45). 
Reedy was served with the Order to Show Cause on May 9, 
1995, (R. 46), after he had been apprehended on a second bench 
warrant issued by the district court on the same date. (R. 53). 
At that time, Reedy also received a document entitled "Amended 
Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause," which stated that 
he had violated his probation by failing (1) to report to AP&P, 
in violation of the usual and ordinary conditions of probation 
set by AP&P, (2) to pay $4444 restitution as ordered by the 
district court, and (3) to pay the $500 fine ordered by the 
court. (R. 51-52).2 At a hearing held on June 5, 1995, Reedy 
admitted that he violated the terms of his probation agreement as 
set forth in the amended affidavit. (R. 188-89). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 
1992), the running of the probationary period is tolled by one of 
two events, both of which occurred here: (1) the filing of a 
violation report, or (2) the issuance of an order to show cause 
or warrant by the court. Because the running of the probationary 
1
 While Reedy argues on appeal that this affidavit "does not 
reflect that it was served at anytime on Reedy or his counsel," 
see Aplt. Brief at 7, Reedy acknowledged at a hearing held on 
May 22, 1995, that he had received the affidavit. (R. 183). 
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period was tolled, Reedyfs probation did not expire, and the 
district court had jurisdiction to revoke Reedy's probation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE RUNNING OF THE PROBATIONARY 
PERIOD WAS TOLLED, THE DISTRICT COURT MAINTAINED 
JURISDICTION TO REVOKE REEDY1S PROBATION. 
Reedy argues on appeal that his probation revocation 
proceedings were not initiated until after his probation had 
expired. However, this argument ignores the plain language of 
Utah's probation statute, which provides for the tolling of the 
probationary period upon the occurrence of certain events. 
Because Reedy was originally placed on probation in 
May 1992, the version of the Utah Code in effect at that time 
governs. See Smith v. Cook.. 803 P.2d 788, 796 n.40 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Kahlr 814 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah App. 1991), cert. 
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). At that time, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(9) (b) (Supp. 1992)2 provided: 
The running of the probation period is 
tolled upon the filing of a violation report 
with the court alleging a violation of the 
terms and conditions of probation or upon the 
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court. 
Thus, under the plain language of section 77-18-1(9) (b), the 
probationary period ceases to run upon the occurrence of one of 
two events: (1) the filing of a probation violation report with 
the court or (2) the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
2This section is currently codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(11)(b) (Supp. 1996). 
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In the present case, AP&P filed a Progress/Violation Report 
indicating that Reedy had violated the terms of his probation on 
June 25, 1993. Furthermore, on the same date, the district court 
issued both an order to show cause and a warrant for Reedy's 
arrest. Thus, even though only one of these two events would 
have to occur to toll Reedy!s probationary period, both occurred 
in the present case. It follows that Reedy1s probation did not 
expire in November 1993, when it was originally set to expire, 
but the expiration of his probation was postponed by the above 
events. Accordingly, Reedyfs argument that the district court 
did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation is without 
merit. 
Additionally, because Reedy1s probationary period was tolled 
by AP&P's filing of a probation violation report and the district 
court's issuance of an order to show cause and warrant, the cases 
relied upon by Reedy are inapposite. Prior to adding an express 
tolling provision to section 77-18-1 in 1989, £££ Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(8) (b) (Supp. 1989), the Utah Legislature provided no 
mechanism for postponing the expiration of a probationary period. 
Thus, courts were constrained by the limits placed on them by the 
prior versions of section 77-18-1. 
For instance, in Smith v. Cookr the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the district court lacked authority to revoke probation 
after the probationary period because the prisoner was not served 
with the order to show cause within such period. Smith, 803 P.2d 
at 793-94. However, because Smith was originally placed on 
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probation in July 1981, that case was decided under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981)f and its holding was specifically 
limited to probationers who had been placed on probation under 
that version of the statute. £££ id. at 796, n. 40. In fact, 
the court expressly noted therein that the language of the 
section involved in the present case could change the district 
court's authority to revoke probation: 
The holding in this case is applicable 
to probationers who have been placed on 
probation under section 77-18-1 (Supp. 1981). 
Subsequent amendments to section 77-18-1 may 
affect the authority of the trial court to 
revoke probation after the probation period 
has terminated. The present probation 
statute, section 77-18-1 (8) (b) (Supp. 1990), 
for instance, reads, "The running of the 
probation period is tolled upon the filing of 
a violation report with the court alleging a 
violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to 
show cause or warrant by the court." 
Similarly, in State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that exercise of the district court's 
probationary powers must be authorized by statute. Id. at 464. 
Thus, the court held that the district court did not have the 
authority to revoke Green's probation after his probationary 
period had expired by the terms of section 77-18-1. Id. at 465. 
However, as in Smith, the version of section 77-18-1 at issue in 
Green, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Interim Supp. 1984) pre-dated 
the addition of the language providing for the express tolling of 
a probationary period. 
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Likewise, State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995), 
which is also relied upon by Reedy here, concerned a defendant 
who had been originally placed on probation prior to the addition 
of the language at issue here. See id. at 1064. Thus, in that 
case, this Court relied upon the version of section 77-18-1 that 
was in place at that time, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1985). 
Id. at 1065 nn.1-3. Accordingly, Reedy1s reliance upon these 
cases for the proposition that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to revoke his probation under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1 (Supp. 1992) is misplaced. 
Lastly, the fact that Reedy did not receive notice of the 
order to show cause or the arrest warrant until after he was 
apprehended in May 1995, does not raise due process concerns 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (Supp. 1992).3 First, as 
noted above, the notice required by this section was given within 
Reedy*s probationary period, since that period was tolled on 
June 25, 1993, when AP&P filed its Progress/ Violation Report. 
Second, the fact remains that Reedy absconded to California, in 
violation of the terms of his probation. Even though AP&P was 
aware of the fact that Reedy was in California, this did not 
impose on it an affirmative duty to locate him, a point which 
Reedy freely concedes. (See R. 93). Third, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(9) (a) (i) (Supp. 1992), if a probationer is exonerated 
following a probation violation hearing, the time between when 
3This section is currently codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(12) (Supp. 1996). 
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the probation violation is alleged and when the hearing is held 
is counted toward service of the total probation term. Thus, if 
Reedy had been exonerated at the June 25, 1995, hearing, he would 
have no time remaining on his probation term. However, he was 
not exonerated, but rather he admitted the very violations 
alleged. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by revoking Reedy1s probation. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the district court's order 
denying Reedy's motion to reconsider and revoking his probation 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U day of December, 1996. 
JJORjtfAN E. PLATE"" 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following this &< day of December, 
1996; 
LINDA M. JONES - 5497 
DEBORAH KREEK MENDEZ - 5743 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
<A4*K4,<A. !£&_ 
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ADDENDUM A 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) 
-vs- Case No. 911901376 FS 
ROBERT REEDY, JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on for hearing on Monday, September 18, 
1995, for consideration and determination of Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Probation 
Revocation, which had been filed herein on or about August 16, 1995. The Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki, District Judge, presided. Defendant was present, and was represented by Deborah 
Kreeck Mendez,. The State was represented by Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney. 
The matter was called, and the Court indicated that it had received, reviewed and was 
conversant with the Motion of Defendant, as well as the supporting and opposing memoranda 
relating thereto. The Court thereafter permitted and heard the arguments of counsel. Being fully 
advised and informed in the premises, for good cause shown, the Court, having previously made 
ORDER 
Case No. 911901376 FS 
Page 2 
and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following 
Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Probation Revocation is denied. 
2. Defendant's probation is revoked, based upon his admitted violations of the terms 
and conditions of probation imposed by this Court on May 8, 1992. 
3. Defendant's commitment to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate period of 
from zero to five years, which was imposed and stayed by this Court on May 8, 1992, and which 
stay was lifted, and the committment imposed on June 5, 1995, is affirmed and will remain the 
Order and Judgment of the Court. 
DATED this / 7 day of September, 1995. 
ORDER 
Case No. 911901376 FS 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to 
Deborah Kreeck Mendez, Attorney for Defendant, at 424 East 500 South. Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 on the /f^ciay of September, 1995. 
Deputy District Attorney 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, ) AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs-
ROBERT REEDY, Case No. 911901376 FS 
Defendant. JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on for hearing on Monday, September 18, 
1995, for consideration and determination of Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Probation 
Revocation, which had been filed herein on or about August 16, 1995. The Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki, District Judge, presided. Defendant was present, and was represented by Deborah 
Kreeck Mendez,. The State was represented by Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney. 
The matter was called, and the Court indicated that it had received, reviewed and was 
conversant with the Motion of Defendant, as well as the supporting and opposing memoranda 
relating thereto. The Court thereafter permitted and heard the arguments of counsel. Being fully 
advised and informed in the premises, for good cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 911901376 FS 
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Findings of Fact 
1. On August 24, 1991, Defendant was arrested and booked on the charge of Theft, a 
Second Degree Felony, arising from the alleged theft, by Defendant and a co-defendant Michael 
K. Davis, of property, in excess of $ 1,000.00 in value, from Bruce Lee. 
2. On April 10, 1992, Defendant pled guilty to the crime of Theft, a Third Degree 
Felony. 
3. On May 8, 1992, the Court, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding, 
sentenced Defendant to a term of indeterminate incarceration at the Utah State Prison for a period 
of not less than 0 years and not more than 5 years, and imposed a fine of $ 500.00 plus the 
applicable surcharge. This sentence was stayed, on the condition of Defendant's successful 
completion of 18 months of formal, supervised probation to Adult Probation and Parole 
(hereinafter referred to as "AP&P"). 
4. On June 25, 1993, Agent Spencer Nielsen of AP&P submitted to the Court a 
Progress/Violation Report, informing the Court that Defendant had failed to phone in for the 
months of April, May and June of 1993, and was not home when a home visit was conducted. 
The report further indicated that Defendant's brother had indicated that Defendant was in 
California. 
5. On June 25th, 1993 this Court, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, issued 
an Order to Show Cause, ordering Defendant to appear before the Court and show cause why his 
probation should not be revoked and his original prison sentence imposed. This Order was based 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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upon the Affidavit of Agent Spencer Nielsen of AP&P, who on June 25, 1993, testified under 
oath, via said Affidavit, that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by: 
(a) having left the State of Utah without prior written authorization; 
(b) having failed to pay the restitution amount of $ 4,444.00 as ordered by the 
Court; and 
(c) having failed to pay the fine of $ 500.00 as ordered by the Court. 
6. Defendant's 18 month probation began to run on May 8, 1992. 
7. On June 25, 1993, a violation report alleging violations by Defendant of his 
probation was filed with the Court, and an order to show cause, and a warrant for arrest were 
issued by the Court.Defendant was improperly, and without authorization, absent from the State 
of Utah, in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. 
8. Because Defendant absconded from probation and left the State of Utah, he was 
not served with the Order to Show Cause and Affidavit until May 9,1995. 
9. On June 5, 1995, Defendant admitted the allegations of the Affidavit and 
Amended Affidavit, thereby admitting that he had failed to report to AP&P since March 5, 1993, 
that he had failed to pay his restitution obligation of $ 4,444.00, and that he had failed to pay his 
fine of $ 500.00 plus the applicable surcharge. 
10. Defendant failed to report to AP&P from March 5, 1993 until his arrest on the 
Order to Show Cause warrant; failed to pay his restitution obligation of $ 4,444.00; failed to pay 
his fine of $ 500.00 plus the applicable surcharge; actively evaded supervision by failing to 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 911901376 FS 
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report for over two years; failed to submit to visits by AP&P; secreted himself from AP&P for 
over two years; and absconded from probation by leaving the State of Utah, prior to completing 
his probation 
11. On June 5, 1995, this Court revoked Defendant's probation, based upon his 
admitted probation violations, and imposed the previously stayed prison sentence of 0-5 years 
committment to the Utah State Prison as provided by statute for the crime of Theft, a Third 
Degree Felony. 
12. Under the Utah Code's 1995 legislative amendments, the crime of which 
Defendant was convicted in 1992, would, if committed now, be a Class A Misdemeanor. 
13. Defendant was sentenced on May 8, 1992. At the time of his sentence, the crime 
of which he had been convicted was a third degree felony, punishable by a term of incarceration 
of from zero to five years. 
FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND 
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Utah law provides that "the running of the probation period is tolled upon the 
filing of a violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court". Utah Code 
Ann. §77-18-1(1 l)(b) [1995]. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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2. In this case, Defendant's 18 month probation began to run on May 8, 1992. On 
June 25, 1993, a violation report alleging violations by Defendant of his probation was filed with 
the Court, and an order to show cause, and a warrant for arrest were issued by the Court. Thus, 
all three tolling events contemplated by the statute occurred. The plain language of the statute 
operates, in this case, to suspend Defendant's probation period, as of June 25. 1993. Defendant 
had, at that time, completed only 12 and 1/2 months of his probation. 
3. Given the statutory tolling effect of the violation report, order to show cause and 
bench warrant, the Court had jurisdiction over Defendant when he admitted the allegations of 
violation on June 5, 1995. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(a)(i) [1995] provides that "any time served by a 
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probationer, out of confinement, after having been charged with a probation violation and prior 
to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation 
term, unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation". 
5. None of the time which passed after the probation violation charges were filed 
counted toward the original eighteen months of probation. Thus, Defendant stood before the 
Court on June 5, 1995, with five and one-half months of his probation yet to be served. 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a) [1995] provides that if the defendant, upon the 
expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other 
assessed costs, the court may retain jurisdiction over the defendant, and may treat these failures 
as contempt of court and impose any suspended jail or prison sentence. 
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7. Defendant actively evaded supervision by failing to report for over two years, by 
failing to submit to visits, by secreting himself from AP&P for over two years, and by leaving 
the State of Utah, prior to completing his probation. 
8. According to the clear and unambiguous language of the applicable current 
statutes, it is Defendant's own wrongful and illegal conduct and evasion which subjected him to 
ongoing and continual probationary supervision and court jurisdiction. 
9. Defendant's original sentence was pronounced under, and subject to, the rules and 
statutes in existence at the time of the imposition of sentence. Consequently, Defendant's 
original 1992 sentence, imposed in accordance with the law in effect at the time thereof, should 
stand, unaffected by the Utah Legislature's 1995 amendments. 
10. It is the province of the executive, and not the legislature, to reprieve or pardon. 
To hold that the Utah Legislature's 1995 amendments to the theft statutes at issue herein 
commuted Defendant's original sentence would allow the legislature to interfere with the judicial 
branch of the government, and to usurp its duties, and to make a sentence and judgment different 
from that entered in court. 
11. Defendant was sentenced on May 8, 1992. At the time of his sentence, the crime 
of which he had been convicted was a third degree felony, punishable by a term of incarceration 
of from zero to five years. When the Legislature amended the Utah Criminal Code in 1995 to 
provide changes in the degree of severity of various theft offenses, it did nothing to change the 
conviction or original sentence of Defendant. 
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12. Defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of this Court at all times following his 
original conviction, sentence and placement on probation, including all of the time Defendant 
spent evading probation supervision, anc| was subject to the jurisdiction of this Court at the time 
his probation was revoked and the original, stayed sentence imposed. 
13. There is no reason, nor good cause, why Defendant should not serve his original 
sentence as such was imposed by the Court. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was delivered to Deborah Kreeck Mendez, Attorney for Defendant, at 424 
East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the/ / ^day of September, 1995. 
M^PSARMS 
Deputy District Attorney 
